Kenya's Model for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism: the Quintessential Embodiment of the Concept of Human security

By Rosalind Nyawira Macharia PhD (Law)

Abstract

In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published its Human Development report and defined human security as "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want". The UN General Assembly vide resolution 66/290 of 2012 described human security as "the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair". The implementation of Kenya's National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism undertaken under the coordination of the National Counter Terrorism Centre is the contextualization of human security at its best and one of the pioneer efforts in the world to customise the United Nation's Secretary General Plan of Action to prevent and counter violent extremism. This paper focuses on a brief discourse on human security. It illustrates Kenya's model of preventing and countering violent extremism and exemplifies its character as a home-grown solution to a perennial security problem. The implementation of the strategy is a departure from state-based security towards an all-of-society-based security system. The emergent enlightened and empowered society, choosing to confront their vulnerabilities rather than live in fear of violent extremists is a chronicle worth unfurling. The methodology is largely qualitative. The paper relies mostly on documentary analysis of national and county-level strategies for countering violent extremism, action plans, surveys and research policy reports on violent extremism trends and dynamics in the region. The paper also elucidates the good practices arising out of the gallant efforts that can be shared regionally and internationally especially in view of the perplexing spread of violent extremism in Africa.

Key Words: *County Action Plans, Good Practices, Human Security, Strategy, Violent Extremism*

Introduction

The 1994 UNDP Human Development Report has been heralded as the "the publication which really promoted the new concept" of human security (Bosold & Werthes, 2005). This report clearly states that human security 'understands security first and foremost as the prerogative of the individual, and links the concept of security inseparably to ideas of human rights and dignity to the relief of human suffering', (Commission on Human Security, 2003). It goes farther to outline the components of human security as follows: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security (Commission on Human Security, 2003).

In the 2022 Special Report on Human Security, the United Nations Development Program noted that in almost all countries, the people's sense of safety and security had declined (Special Report on Human Security, 2022). This can be attributed to COVID 19 pandemic and the war against Ukraine, which rekindled the horror of strong states forcing their ideologies on others militarily. Indeed, there was some sort of general conviction that conventional battles between states were enfolded into the annals of history, until Russia invaded Ukraine. The world powers' immersion in this war and the deleterious effects it is having on economies means that there will be a shift of strategy and a realignment of priorities in the national domain.

All this is happening in the backdrop of a growing terrorist threat in Africa, with Daesh offshoots emerging across the region. From the east coast, horn, north, west, central and the south, Africa is erupting with a new ideological enemy, in addition to the existential poverty, disease, misgovernment and consequent military carnage (Field, 2004). Africa is in an idiosyncratic position, right in the midst of a globalization system that does not necessarily address the very problems that affront her. Since her own civilization was cut short by colonial powers and a western civilization imposed on her people, she has been subservient to policies

made in the west that she implements sometimes under diplomatic duress. It has long been proponed that Africa should start customizing these policies to suit her exigencies (Ukeje, 2010).

Kenya's response to violent extremism is one such adaptation to deal with the dilemma that she was presented with when her own children affixed themselves to a cause they never knew neither understood. Predominantly, since the arrival of Islam at the Coast around 700 AD, coastal residents practiced the Shafii strand of Islam, which was pious and civil. The geo-politics of the Middle East, especially the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran in the late 20th Century contributed to an ideological shift in the Kenyan Coast. Threatened by the new Islamic Republic of Iran, Saudi Arabia started a scholarship program for the youth and clerics to universities in Saudi Arabia. Their return in the 1980s saw a transference of ideology to Salafism; they started condemning popular practices as non-religious and called for a return to pure Islam. They got a following especially amongst the youth and became very intolerant to anyone who showed a different inclination. They also started a rallying call to 'reclaim' religion from those who were desecrating it (Boga, Shauri, & Mwakimako, 2021). Thus, radicalisation began and spread to other counties in the country.

The 1998 twin attacks against the United States of America's embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam was the harbinger of the serious threat of international terrorism that Kenya still battles two and a half decades later. In 2002, the Kikambala Paradise hotel in Mombasa was the scene of another ugly attack. The 2010 decade saw a rapid succession of random grenade and improvised explosive devices attacks, followed by the infamous Westgate attack in 2013, Garissa University attack in 2015 and the Riverside attack in 2019 (Harper, 2019).

The 1998 and 2002 attacks were coordinated by foreigners within the Al Qaida organization however, in a tectonic shift that was unforeseen, Kenyan youth got embroiled in the 'jihadi' narrative espoused by AQ then, and many started a relocation to Somalia for training under some ideologues who had come back from Afghanistan. They were later instrumental in the formation of the terrorist group in Somalia, the Al Shabaab Al Harakat Al Mujahideen (AS) (Maaruf &

Joseph, 2018). Indeed, the subsequent attacks would be perpetrated by Kenyan youth or a combination of Kenyan and Somali youth.

Naturally, Kenya had responded to this material threat with counter terrorism measures, involving the identification and the prosecution of perpetrators. With time, it became apparent that there was need to stem the tide of youth movement to Somalia which was then buoyed by the enunciation of a radical and violent Islamic ideology by radical clerics especially in places of worship and spread of extremist content online (Van Metre, 2016). This necessitated a discourse of prevention and countering of this ideology which spontaneously led to violent extremism.

NCTC, which had been established by a cabinet decision in 2004 and enshrined in statute in 2012 was then mandated to coordinate efforts to counter and prevent radicalization. The first order of business was to establish a framework within which to carry out this mandate.

Theoritical framework

This paper proffers the Securitization Theory as the basis of the discussion, from amongst others, mainly because it seeks to explain "…how traditional and non-traditional security threats are perceived and managed, chiefly by states" (Seniwati, 2014). This theory is attributed to the Copenhagen School of Security Studies and scholars such as Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, and Jaap de Wilde who posit, rightly so, that security in international relations is about survival. It widens the concept of security to include terrorism among other unique threats such as trafficking, and acknowledges a person and his immediate community as key players in the security domain negating the concept that security belongs exclusively to security players (Buzan, 2006). Terrorism causes an existential threat to the state and society as the referrent objects, and this has generally been accepted by varied targeted audiences as a matter of fact. Balzacq (2016) considers other factors left out by the Copenhagen School to include the speech act to a significant audience whose experiences are such that they understand why the securitizing agent is making the speech act, especially if the audience has suffered

a detriment from the act sought to be securitized. For terrorism therefore, the state as the securitizing agent has an audience in the population; which has been the target of a terrorist act and has suffered a detriment. This audience provides moral support and gives the state the moral mandate without which no policy to address the threat would be possible. Policies to counter and prevent violent extremism are granted by this mandate. While a move to securitize contributes to the outcome, several sectors fill up the context. In the Kenyan case, all sectors are rallied, including political, military, and socio-economic, thus fulfilling the criteria set out by Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka (2016) for this theory to apply.

Methodology

The main aim of this paper is to elaborate the unique measures undertaken by Kenya in response to the threat of radicalisation, which eventually leads to violent extremism and the commission of a terrorist act. This will be explained through qualitative methodology, which asserts a multiplicity of truths based on the writer's construction of reality (Sale, 2006). This reality will be interpreted and constructed in unpacking the social phenomena of countering and prevention of violent extremism, and the actors involved. The sources of data are the national and county-level strategies for countering violent extremism, plans of action, surveys and research policy reports on violent extremism trends and dynamics in the region.

Discussion and analysis of findings

The national Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE)

Out of necessity, the NSCVE was formulated in 2016 to rally all sectors of the Kenyan social, religious and economic life to emphatically and continuously reject violent extremist ideologies and shrink the pool of individuals that terrorist groups seek to radicalize and recruit.

In his foreword, the former President Uhuru Kenyatta noted that the strategy responded:

> "… to the need to drain our society of radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism by engaging the public and all instruments of national power. It will be driven forward by a strengthened National Counter Terrorism Centre whose inter-agency nature is key to effectively coordinate different arms of government and multiple stakeholders in the civil space". (Government of Kenya, 2016)

The strategy aims at countering violent extremism through a whole-of-society approach whereby all citizens, including security actors, media practitioners, communities, religious leaders and business owners would be rallied to reject extreme narratives and help develop and disseminate effective messages responsive to the situation and threat. It would also guide the development of mechanisms to offer support to local communities specifically those targeted by violent extremists by providing an all-inclusive approach to address their vulnerabilities.

Imperatively, some of the youth that went to combat theatres became disgruntled and wanted to come back home (Speckhard & Shajkovci, 2019). The strategy aims at targeting such violent extremists who want to disengage from their chosen lifestyles by carrying out deradicalisation, rehabilitative and reintegration practices under a framework consisting of their families, communities and the civil society, and coordinated by the government. Recognising the stigma that terrorism attached to the perpetrators and their families, the strategy aims at relieving the tension between communities and security actors by growing the expertise amongst security actors and capacitate them to appreciate and adopt non-coercive measures insistent on the respect of human rights and freedoms.

The strategy document is a guide to interventions in the online spaces, given the swift growth in technology and the opportunities in there for terrorists to recruit and share their narratives. In addition, the dynamism of terrorism means that things will change rapidly, or undergo complex metamorphosis. Research to understand the changes is part of any strategy so that existing practices do not become dogmatic and get affixed to history. Finally, the strategy has galvanised international and regional players to support the countering violent extremism

framework, because terrorism is transnational and converging to fight terror is a promotion of human security.

In order to achieve the aforementioned aims, the NSCVE clearly sets out the pillars useful for its implementation, viz:

i. Psychosocial Pillar

This is based on recognition of the fact that radicalized persons and violent offenders desirous of disengaging from the extreme leanings require psychological examination to gauge the depth of their ideology. Disengaging a terrorist from the ideals for which he is ready to die is not an exact science thus the need for psychological assessment. Support for their families who are likely to be stigmatized and live in trauma, fear and shame also falls under this pillar. In execution of this pillar, a group of forensic and clinical psychologists, working hand in hand with faith leaders have been trained on CVE strategies and how to assess a violent extremist offender. This training is continuous; to take into account the evolving threat.

The disengagement program targets individuals that are radicalised and on the brink of joining violent extremist groups, members of terrorist groups who have not committed or facilitated violent attacks in Kenya or abroad, individuals who have voluntarily defected from terrorist organisations and those in prisons convicted of terrorist-related crimes and who pose a risk of radicalising fellow inmates or who voluntarily seek to be de-radicalised while serving their sentences. The goal is to take them through processes that enable them forswear violence, reject violent extremist ideologies, and become law-abiding citizens at the local and national levels. This is an ongoing program whose success is measured by the movement of an individual from a suspect or victim to a survivor to an ambassador continuum.

ii. Political pillar

Political leaders have the their mandate to legislate, provide oversight and engage the public will individually, collectively, and in collaboration with government agencies, a channel that CVE actors exploit to advocate for increased cohesion,

patriotism, and rejection of all extremist ideologies based on religious or ethnic dogma. To actualize this pillar, the political class has been engaged in review of the laws, such as the amendment to the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA 2012) and through the Statute Law Amendment Act 2014 (SLAA 2014) that gave more functions to the NCTC. Another novel development has been the push to have counties enact CVE laws to mainstream CVE within the county structures especially those dealing with youth and gender. The purpose is to include deradicalisation programs as part of the interventions to uplift the youth, taking cognisance of the push and pull factors that enhance vulnerability. This is especially critical for counties that have contributed substantially to the combat theatre statistics. Indeed, the Nairobi county was the first one to legislate as such (Nairobi City County, 2022).

iii. Security Pillar

This pillar espouses the legal provisions in Kenya's criminal justice system that are applicable to crimes associated with violent extremism. POTA and other relevant legislation have measures against radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism. Under this pillar, security actors are also brought to the PCVE table to make them aware of the long term benefits of draining the pool, avoid responses that might exacerbate radicalization and understand strategies useful within their line of work that eliminate fear and apathy from the citizens towards the security actors (Van Metre, 2016). At the same time, other PCVE players are also obligated to understand their legal responsibilities as citizens, including reporting crime and collaborating with security actors for a common purpose, under the do-no-harm principle. It is also important for other players to understand that terrorists would be keen to infiltrate PCVE work and scatter this labour of love, thus the need to work hand in hand with security to identify and nip such attempts in the bud. NCTC has organized dialogue between county community leaders, faith leaders and security leaders and brought them to a convergence of grievances, blame games and ultimately an appreciation of the dynamics and complexities that they face severally and collectively (Ervin, 2016). Trust has been built in these fora, networks have been made and fear and suspicion levels have come down substantively. This started with the counties heavily affronted by violent extremism and the conversation is extending to other counties.

iv. Faith Based and Ideological Pillar

Ideology is usually the overt justification of terrorist acts, thus when dealing with religious terrorism, it can never be overlooked (Tarlow, 2017). The NSCVE defines ideology responsible for the violent extremism exhibited by Al Qaida, Al Shabaab and other Islamic radical groups as a political project that manipulatively utilises a selective literalism of some Islamic religious texts and histories to justify terrorist violence and falsely claiming to protect and advance Islam (Mwangi, 2020). The ideology justifies the murder of those who do not adhere to its political and religious views, and is fundamentally anti-democratic.

This pillar is meant to immunize Kenyans against such beliefs by emboldening the moderate voices of faith to come out and without fear counter the malignancy of this ideology. Under this pillar, different faiths are gathered to speak in one voice, especially given that most faith leaders hold sway within the populace and have plausible believability, eventually influencing and shaping opinion and action (Ishaku, Aksit, Maza, 2021). Imperatively, in some of the past attacks, Al Shabaab deceivingly projected a religious war by targeting persons who did not ascribe to the Islamic faith. Fortunately, their efforts came to naught due to concerted efforts, as part of implementing the NSCVE, to bring people of different faiths into an interfaith community. This pillar complements the psychosocial pillar in disengagement because faith leaders who are well versed in the true tenets of religion are able to gauge how extreme the subject of disengagement is; make an assessment during the process on the gains made in changing 'ideals' and advise in cases where the subject rejects the disengagement attempts.

The NCTC has gathered together various faith leaders in the counties, and have merged them regionally into strong inter-faith communities. While some are still in the formative stages, others are so strong that they have become trusted reference points for youth wanting to disengage. They have also diffused tensions amongst their communities where there is misunderstanding within different faiths, such as in the style of worship or mode of dressing in schools. These inter-faith groups consist of respected religious scholars who are connected to young people and can reach out to them and delegitimise the radicalisation messaging (Mandaville & Nozell, 2017). In the past, places of worship were used as radicalizing centre;

however, the cooperation in the inter-faith family and the self-policing has shrunk these spaces and the vice has moved to the online spaces.

v. Education, Training and Capacity Building Pillar

This is a cross-cutting pillar; and has been very well implemented diversely across every sector of society. All actors mandated with countering radicalization and recruitment are equipped with the right skills, tools and awareness relevant for their mission. This is one pillar that has been thoroughly discharged, within government ministries, departments and agencies, within the private sectors, educational institutions of higher learning, private security sector, teachers and facilitators. Indeed, many great partnerships have been forged in this space (Ramadhan, Ouma, Mutahi, & Ruteere, 2021).

This pillar recognizes three aspects based on the Kenyan experience; first, that education institutions have been targeted by terrorist recruiters who promote intolerance and thus there is need to expose learners to values that promote free thought, tolerance, diversity and moderation. Secondly, that educating the citizenry is an enhancement of human security because they become aware and live without fear. Thirdly, that entrenching prevention and resilience measures in the education system is a strong tool against vulnerability to radicalization. Ingraining the values especially in basic education institutions ensures that they are forever imprinted in the psyche of the learners, who grow up as patriotic well-informed citizens. To this end, NCTC have developed a policy document, the Child Safety and Security against Violent Extremism to be incorporated in the curriculum of basic and secondary education. Hundreds of teachers have been capacitated to spot any signs of radicalization amongst students. Moreover, drama and music teachers have been trained to influence the themes of the drama festivals to exhibit an awareness of terrorism and CVE; indeed, such themes have featured prominently in the drama and music festivals in 2015, 2018 and 2019 (Wambugu, 2015), (Mutunga, Musyoka, & Nyakundi, 2019), (Epukaugaidi, 2018).

In addition to training, advisory security surveys have been conducted in schools, hotels, universities, health facilitators, water and energy infrastructure amongst others, as part of protection of critical infrastructure (Niemi, Benjamin, Kuusisto, Gearon, 2018).

vi. Legal and Policy Pillar

There is a constant need to update laws and generate policies that address the metamorphosis of terrorism. The innate nature of law is that it requires proactivity to ride along with societal changes, otherwise it dawdles while society flies past, and eventually becomes archaic (Schanzer, Kurzman, Toliver & Miller, 2016). This stance is unaffordable in countering terrorism; the price would be too dear to pay. While law makers are perpetually being lobbied as aforementioned, NCTC has also actively generated policies to fill up any lacuna that would cause a break in the chain. Policies such as CSSAVE and the Counter Terrorist Security Coordinator (CT SecCo) have been generated and customized to address protection of public places in Kenya (Botha & Abdile, 2020).

vii. Media and Online Pillar

This pillar recognizes the role played by the media in propagation of terrorism and also in countering of violent extremism. Media is indeed a force multiplier; thus all terrorists desire to publicise their conquests. The Al Shabaab modus operandi includes a media team in every attack, to capture the moment for future propaganda. Other terrorist groups globally have been competing as to who produces and disseminates the most gruesome content online (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2012). With the advancement of technology and the meteoric rise of social media, every one with a technical gadget has literally become a journalist, albeit minus the ethics. Training, radicalization and recruitment to terrorist groups is rampant in the online spaces.

In the past, the media has unwittingly played into the hands of terrorists by broadcasting attack scenes that propel the invincibility myth and impunity of the attackers. A recent report published by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) showed how terrorists are using the internet and adopting to new technologies much to their benefit (ISD, 2021).

It is particularly important for CVE practitioners to keep up with the pace of innovation by terrorist groups. This pillar seeks to grow a partnership between the media (and big technology companies) with CVE practitioners to deny terrorist the enabling environment for the spread of their narratives and to use the fora

positively to negate these narratives (Amit, Barua & Al Kafy, 2021). Sensitizing the media on developing and deploying compelling alternative and counter-narratives, engaging technology companies on extremist content, formulating a regulatory framework, rallying the citizens to identify and reject extremist content and ensuring that government agencies have a coordinated and effective strategic messaging process are part of the efforts under this pillar. NCTC has invested in a solid relationship with the media and has offered training on CVE and ethical reporting of terrorist attacks; as such the reporting of the riverside attack of 2019 was a stark positive contrast with that of previous attacks. (Musoma, 2020)

In 2022, NCTC with support of the European Union carried out a media CVE campaign on television, radio, and in the online spaces on alternative narratives to extremist content. (National Counterterrorism Centre, 2022)

viii. Arts and Culture pillar

> Radicalisation is indeed an affront to culture as it delegitimizes existing traditions and purports to cleanse them and introduce new loftier ones. It is thus no wonder that at the height of its success in Syria, part of the Daesh's strategy was to destroy cultural sites that had existed for eons. (Curry, 2015)

Al Qaida in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) destroyed ancient Islamic and historical manuscripts in that ancient town of Timbuktu in 2013. (Maroonian, 2013). Closer home, Al Shabaab in 2012 bombed the National Theatre in Mogadishu just as it reopened after being closed for years, and have been active in destroying graves of Sufi sheikhs and other cultural representation that they felt irked their ideology. (Al Jazeera, 2008).Terrorist desire that their audience live in captivity, physically and mentally. This pillar envisages promotion of cultural and arts festivals, diversity, support music, theatre, and book festivals that are accessible to the broadest possible audiences.

County Action Plans (CAPs)

The Constitution of the Republic of Kenya 2010 introduces a dual system of people's representation and governance, at the national level and at the local

level via administrative boroughs with territorial boundaries called the counties. Article 6 of the Constitution provides that Kenya is divided into counties, and that 'the governments at the national and county levels are distinct and inter-dependent and shall conduct their mutual relations on the basis of consultation and cooperation'. The First Schedule to the Constitution outlines the 47 counties that make up Kenya's devolved units.

The NSCVE envisages coordinated action at both the national and county level (Strong Cities Network Programmes, 2019). At the national level, the coordination includes linkages between the various government agencies, law makers, multilateral organisations, private sector, non-governmental organization, civil society and countries sharing interests with Kenya. Resources are scarce, thus need to rally all of government to ensure PCVE is mainstreamed in the normal business of county and national governments. At the same time, rallying regional, multilateral and bilateral partnerships to share experience, skills and tools are paramount; they save on resources and ensure that just as terrorists transcend boundaries, the responses are also borderless.

As part of cascading the efforts, NCTC in conjunction with various stakeholders formulated plans for implementation of the NSCVE in every county. The Centre developed the Guiding Principles for County Action Plans as the start of a unique innovation bringing together government and citizens to counter violent extremism and develop resilience within communities (Strong Cities Network Programmes, 2019). These guidelines were a precursor to the CAPs, which were inspired and aligned to the NSCVE. If there ever was a novel invention distinctive to Kenya, the CAPs scoop the prize. Nexus with efforts such as Nyumba Kumi, Peace Committees, and Community Policing, County leadership, Senators, local MPs, MCAs and other elected officials have been prioritized.

Imperatively, different counties in the country are impacted differently by terrorism. Profiles and geographies for extremism are dynamic. As such and while it is important to focus on 'hotspots' of recruitment, it is equally important to protect areas that have not been drawn into mass radicalisation by ensuring that radicalisers and their message do not find ready pathways. That informed the decision to have a CAP for every county. The framing of the county action

plans took into consideration the security, cultural, economics, geopolitics, socio-political and the population dynamics in each county. The CAPs process started in 2016 with multiple stakeholders modelling the CAP in what is popularly referred in the PCVE nomenclature as the first generation CAPs, to be reviewed every 5 years. In 2018, the second generation CAPs modified the previous ones by incorporating an objectivity of performance and measurement, under the Objective Key Results (OKR) model (Doerr, 2018). In 2019, the third generation CAPs famously known as the rapid CAPs (R-CAPS) were adopted. These have also been undergoing annual examination to ensure they are still relevant to terrorism morphology, that their impact is measurable and positive, and that they remain platforms for action through solution-seeking, collaboration, coordination and accountability.

CAPs are implemented through the County Engagement Forum (CEF) under the joint leadership of the County Commissioner (appointed by the National Government as the coordinating office with the County government) and the Governor who is the elected leader of the County. The CEF membership is very inclusive, composed of representatives of the youth, women, persons living with disabilities, minority communities, County Security and Intelligence Committees (CSICs), Community Based Organisations (CBOs), Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), the media, the faith community, educators, and political leaders. The membership is not a fixture; it is reviewed regularly to include emerging P/CVE actors who may not have been active or involved during its formation (Mesok, 2022).

Counties have prioritized the pillars that apply to their communities depending on socio-economic factors traversing the counties. P/CVE cannot be generic, each region has to introspect, dissect their circumstances and espouse what works for them. At the same time, it cannot be "everything for everyone". By being too broad, it waters down the efforts, and does poorly at aligning them and evaluating their impact. It needs to be tightened to have impact on protecting Kenya and Kenyans from terrorism by building networks and collaboration in the pre-criminal space, and bringing together state and non-state actors to this end (Mbugua & Misiani, 2017).

For instance, while the Taita Taveta county prioritises the economic, media & online, political, ideological and education, Baringo prioritizes education, political, media, gender and law enforcement. This is because from the original study, issues of gender especially women representation were found wanting in the later. Each pillar has a pillar lead who is a mandatory member of the CEF who coordinates the implementation of the pillar, identifies and brings on board other relevant stakeholders.

Case Study: Mombasa County Action Plan

The 28th of November 2002 terrorist attack at the Kikambala Paradise hotel in Mombasa that left fifteen people dead, including three suicide bombers, three tourists and nine Kenyans was a game changer for the county of Mombasa with regard to security and the fight against terrosim, radicalization and insurgecncy. It became apparent as investigations started that there had been an attempt to down the Arkia Airliner, a chartered Israeli flight that was departing from Mombasa to Tel Aviv, in a coordinated attack targeting Israeli interests. The undetonated missile was found within the precincts of Moi International Airport. The economic effects came in quick succession; the British, Australia, Canada and the United States of America immediately shut their embassies temporarily and issued travel advisories to their citizens against visiting Kenya. Israel stopped charted flights to Kenya altogether. The fact that the attack was largely planned in Mombasa brought all the limelight on the town. (Theuri, 2020)

Despite being the smallest county, Mombasa has a very unique history and culture. Indeed, in the preamble to the June 2022 revised CAP, the former and first governor of Mombasa, in an illustration of Mombasa's diversity wrote "….the Muslim call to prayer (The Adhan) is normally heard with the backdrop of church bells, and Hindu temples and Sikh Gurdwalas are part of the city's landmark" (Mombasa County Action Plan for Preventing and countering violent extremism).The Kenyan coast has traditionally had a very moderate strand of Islam, which was exported by the Arabs. The intermarriage with locals brought a perfect blend of culture and religion where communities interacted with a high sense of decorum.

In formulating the Mombasa CAP, the history, the intermingling of culture, the economic importance especially as the main port of Kenya, its access from various combat theatres among other factors had to be considered. The first generation Mombasa CAP was very elaborate, giving a brief history of Mombasa and fronting its uniqueness. It elucidated in details the objectives, the methodology for prioritization of the pillars, the implementation plan and the mechanism for measuring results and effects. Subsequent revisions have concentrated on ensuring the CAP is still responsive to the threat of radicalization and that its implementation improves societal understanding and resilience against violent extremism.

The June 2022 revision upgraded the implementation framework by defining the deliverables within the next one year. The pillars currently prioritized are ideological, legal and law enforcement, political, education, economic and gender. The table below is an excerpt of the CAP showing the implementation of the ideological pillar:

Ideological Pillar Objective

To strengthen the inter-Religious, inter-cultural, and inter-ethnic dialogue response in neutralizing false ideologies propagating violent extremism in Mombasa County.

Key Results Area (KR)	Activity	Key Performance Indicator (KPI)	Actor/ Person Responsible	Time frame	Budget (Kenya Shillings)	Budget Sources of funds
KR 1.1: Strengthened interreligiou, inter-ethnic, and inter-cultural dialogue between	Activity 1.1.1: Conduct one rotational Inter-ethnic and Inter-religious dialogues	Number of participants reached	CICC-LEAD CEF-SEC-RETARIAT SUPKEM CIPK NCCK HINDU	1st June 2022- 31st May 2023	600,000 per dialogue	Development partners, CSO's, Private sector, National Government and

Key Results Area (KR)	Activity	Key Performance Indicator (KPI)	Actor/ Person Responsible	Time frame	Budget (Kenya Shillings)	Budget Sources of funds
religious institutions and communities	within each of the six sub-counties in Mombasa		CATHOLIC YWCA KMYA HAKI AFRICA			County Government
	Activity 1.1.2: To train and support 1,200 at-risk youths, to improve their response to VE	Number of at-risk young people trained No. Of at risk youth trained and supported	CICC-LEAD CEF-SEC RETARIAT ARIGATOU INTER-NATIONAL KENYA KECO-SCE KMYA HAKI AFRICA	1st June 2022- 31st May 2023	2.4 m	Development partners, CSO's, National government
	Activity 1.1.3: To train and support 600 religious' leaders/ Cultural elders to improve their response to VE.	Number of religious leaders trained	SUPKEM IRCK CIPK NCCK EAK HINDU ATR CATHOLIC YWCA	1st June 2022- 31st May 2023	1.2m	Development partners, CSO's, National government

The above table is just an illustration of how the Mombasa CAP has brought together state and non-state actors to implement and jointly fund PCVE activities.

It also shows objectivity in the expected results, and measurability in the key performance indicators.

Reviewing the NSCVE

The NSCVE is an organic document, which ought to respond to the transference nature of the monstrosity it was conceived to address. It is the subject of an ongoing review, which is at its tail end. Though the review is not a sweeping departure from its original version, it has some new adaptations, including modification of pillars to provide specifically for the citizenship and the youth and gender pillars. Effective participation of women, youth and minorities (ethnic, racial or religious) in P/CVE is key in strengthening community resilience against extremism and terrorism. The inclusion of the victims of terrorism in a significant way is also contemplated in the review.

A do-no-harm approach is also to be considered, given that CVE is a sensitive activity that is being conducted in the context of determined terrorist operations to radicalise, recruit and attack Kenyans. As such, all CVE initiatives should ensure that they do not exacerbate radicalisation or aid terrorism in any way. The idea of monitoring, evaluation and reporting will be explicitly in-built into all programme concepts, to ensure that CVE efforts are not a risk to the actors in this field, civilians and the nation at all times.

The review also considers three broad levels for prevention. The first level deals with general preventive efforts with the entire Kenyan society to address preconditions that breed the violent extremist ideology. Interventions at this level concentrate on building community resistance and resilience to radicalisation through outreach, dialogue, access, and trust-building. An important aspect of the general preventive work is the 'leverage principle' whereby efforts focus on large groups of people. At this level, the messaging focuses on strengthening social cohesion, citizenship, patriotism, and uplifting African values of unity and social harmony.

Level two deals with specific preventive efforts aimed at individuals and institutions who may be targeted by violent extremists but are still safe. It is

crucial to inform, educate and empower religious leaders, educators, politicians and local communities to know and resist any attempts. Prisons and probation systems must be part of preventive efforts to reduce the risk of radicalization within the facilities,more so to reduce the risk of imprisoned terrorists radicalising their fellow prisoners.

Level three focuses on individual-oriented preventive and curative efforts. These include individuals who are part of a violent extremist group, but are motivated to disengage. If they have already committed terrorist offences, curative interventions will run hand-in-hand with punitive measures according to the prescription under the criminal justice system.

Conclusion

Kenya has learnt many lessons over the years. When terrorism appeared on her space, it was an alien concept in which Kenyans were just collateral damage. Over time, Kenya adopted many strategies and welcomed partners with terrorism knowledge aforethought to help shape responses.

However, with time and in the face of incessant attacks, she had to introspect and craft counter-measures unique to her. Some of the measures have indeed beaten the inbred nature of the threat itself. For instance, Kenya learnt that terrorism is fluid and fast-changing, not confined to nomenclature but to an enduring character. Additionally. global security interests shift all the time, thus Kenya has pegged responses on her own national interests.

Terrorists totally negate human security, especially because the most potent weapon they have on their hands is instilling fear and curtailing freedoms. The response to violent extremism as coordinated by NCTC is the personification of human security in implementing a whole-of-society, whole-of-government outlook. It promotes personal and community security, edifying individuals and communities to be free from fear, take charge of their lives and rise above the abomination of violent extremism. The incorporation of respect of human rights and liberties as an intrinsic philosophy in PCVE by NCTC is the glittering jewel on the crown.

Recommendations

Arising from the foregoing experience and the lessons learnt, the following measures are recommended in the face of an abiding threat:

- Investment and proficiency in strategic communication and new technology is critical since terrorists shift with the drift. PCVE practitioners will not win this alone, thus enduring collaboration with big technological companies is important.
- As much as possible, there is need for a measurement, evaluation, reporting and learning framework for PCVE even though it is not an exact science.
- The CAP model has been very fructuous in reaching the grass root community and creating a sense of responsibility and resilience. While it was originally conceived to address violent extremism arising from international terrorism, it may be efficacious to spiral it to other forms of violent extremism as they manifest. Protracted social and political conflicts, particularly those that are violent, are a powerful driver of violent extremism. Measures must be undertaken to resolve these conflicts through a peace building and reconciliation approach.

References

Aldrick, J. (1995). The Old Town of Mombasa. Kenya Past and Present, 27(1), pp. 11-15.

Al Jazeera. (2008, December). Retrieved from Aljazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2008/12/20/somali-fighters-destroying-shrines

Amit, S., Barua, L. & Al Kafy, A., (2021). Countering violent extremism using social media and preventing implementable strategies for Bangladesh. Heliyon,, 7(5).

Ayad, M., Harrasy, A., & Abdullah, M. A. (2022). Under-Moderated, Unhinged and Ubiquitous: Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State Networks on Facebook . Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Retrieved from https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/0)

Balzacq T et al. (2016) "Securitization' Revisited: Theory and Cases," International Relations, 30(4)p. 495.

Boga, H., Shauri, H., & Mwakimako, H. (2021). Radicalisation into violent extremism in Coastal Kenya: Genesis, Impact and Responses. HORN Institute.

Bosold, D., & Werthes, S. (2005). Human Security in Practice. Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 21(1), 85.

Botha, A. & Abdile, M. (2020). Experiences in the Kenyan Criminal Justice System and Violent Extremism. https://www.peacemakersnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Experiences-in-the-Kenyan-Criminal-Justice-System-and-Rates-of-Violent-Extremism.pdf

Buzan B., (2006) "Will the 'Global War on Terrorism' be the New Cold War?" International Affairs, 82 (6) pp. 1111-2.

Commission on Human Security. (2003). Human Security Now : Protecting and Empowering People. New York: Commission on Human Security.

Curry, A. (2015, September 1). Retrieved from National Geographic: https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/150901-isis-destruction-looting-ancient-sites-iraq-syria-archaeology

Doerr, J. (2018). Measure what matters. London: Portfolio Penguin.

Epukaugaidi. (2018, August 13). Retrieved from epukaugaidi: https://www.epukaugaidi.com/2018/08/13/2018-musical-festival-themes-address-kenyans-on-terrorism/

Ervin, Gail. (2016). Learning from the grassroots: Emergent peacebuilding design in pastoralist Kenya. 10.13140/RG.2.1.3495.5920.

Government of Kenya. (2016). The National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism. National Counter Terrorism Centre. September. Retrieved from National Counterterrorism Centre.

Harper, M. (2019). Everything you have told me is true: the many faces of Al Shabaab. Hurst & Company.

Ishaku, B., Aksit. S. & Maza, K.D. (2021). The Role of Faith-Based Organizations in Counter-Radicalization in Nigeria: The Case of Boko Haram. Religions.; 12(11):1003.

Joanna E., Sale, L. & Brazil K, (2006), "Revisiting the Quantitative-Qualitative Debate: Implications for Mixed-Methods Research," in Quality & Quantity, 36(1) pp. 45.

Mandaville, P. & Nozell, M., (2017). Engaging Religion and Religious Actors in Countering Violent Extremism. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR413-Engaging-Religion-and-Religious-Actors-in-Countering-Violent-Extremism.pdf

Maroonian, A. (2013). Retrieved from CRC.ORG: https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/mali-destruction-world-cultural-heritage

Maruuf, H., & Joseph, D. (2018). Inside Al Shabaab The Secret History of Al-Qaeda's Most Powerful Ally.

(n.d.). Mombasa County Action Plan for Preventing and countering violent extremism.

Mbugua, J. K. & Misiani, M. G., (2017). An Appraisal of the Responsiveness of Countering Violent Extremism Measures.

Mesok, E., (2022). Counterinsurgency, community participation, and the preventing and countering violent extremism agenda in Kenya. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 33:4-5, 720-741

Musoma, A. L. (2020). Retrieved from SU plus: https://su-plus.strathmore.edu/handle/11071/12063

Mutunga, F., Musyoka, S., & Nyakundi, P. (2019, July 6). Retrieved from The County: https://www.kenyanews.go.ke/anti-terrorism-theme-dominates-day-three-of-music-festivals/

Mwangi, M. G., (2020). The Role of Islam in National Cohesion and Integration in Kenya with Specific Focus on Nairobi and Mombasa Counties.

Niemi, P.-M., Benjamin, S., Kuusisto, A., Gearon, L., (2018). How and Why Education Counters Ideological Extremism in Finland. Religions., 9, 420.

Ramadhan, R., Ouma, L., Mutahi, P., & Ruteere, M. (2021). Role-and-Accountability-of-Private-Security-Actors-in-Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya. Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies. Retrieved from https://www.chrips.or.ke/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/Role-and-Accountability-of-Private-Security-Actors-in-CVE-2021.pdf

Schanzer, D., Kurzman, C., Toliver, J. & Miller, E., (2016). Challenge and Promise of Using Community Policing Strategies To Prevent Violent Extremism: A Call for Community Partnerships With Law Enforcement To Enhance Public Safety, Final Report.

Seniwati. (2014, May). The Securitization Theory and Counter Terrorism in Indonesia. Academic Research International, 5(3), 234.

(2022). Special Report on Human Security. United Nations Development Programme. Retrieved from https://hdr.undp.org/content/2022-special-report-human-security

Speckhard, A., & Shajkovci, A. (2019, March). The Jihad in Kenya: Understanding Al-Shabaab Recruitment and Terrorist Activity inside Kenya—in Their Own Words. African Security, 12(1), 3-61. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2019.1587142

Strong Cities Network Programmes, (2019). County Actions Plans in Kenya – Progress and Next Steps. https://strongcitiesnetwork.org/en/county-actions-plans-in-kenya/

Tarlow, P., (2017). The interaction of religion and terrorism. In: IJSSTH, Vol. 16, pp. 1-24.

Theuri, C. (2020, July 5). Retrieved from NATION: https://nation.africa/kenya/life-and-style/dn2/2002-terrorists-hit-paradise-hotel-after-elaborate-planning-913752

Ukeje, C. U. (2010, July). Rethinking Africa's Security in the Age of Uncertain Globalisation: NEPAD and Human Security in the 21st Century. African Journal of International Affairs, 11(1).

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2012). The use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes. New York: United Nations.

Van Metre, L. (2016) 'Community resilience to violent extremism in Kenya', Peaceworks No.22, United States Institute for Peace

Wambugu, S. (2015, April 8). Retrieved from allAfrica: https://allafrica.com/stories/201504080646.html