

Preventive Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa Region: Adapting to the 21st Century Realities

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Abstract

Due to globalization, security concerns are more complex and linked than ever before, necessitating a more active diplomatic involvement. The paper is discussed using the lenses of Buzan and Ole Waever's Regional Security Complex theory (RSCT), which has been rightly applicable for this study in explaining the paradigm shift from the initial realities of the cold war era when regional arrangements of the horn of Africa were largely explained by the offensive theoretical perspective. The study posits that the adjustment and adaptation has been occasioned by the emerging security concerns. The study uses desktop review approach to examine key areas like the strategic interests, geopolitics, and insecurity in the Horn of Africa Region, as well as the conceptual and Analytical Framework of preventive diplomacy and the justification for its use in the Horn of Africa Region. It also examines Preventive Diplomacy and, regional and sub-regional security partnerships in the Horn of Africa area. This study concludes that preventive diplomacy is carried out by numerous actors using a variety of tools. This has been achieved as a result of the development of a normative framework that supports global initiatives to avert violent insecurity concerns in the region. The study recommends that the international community should endeavor to support and increase states' capacity in the region to handle the full range of security concerns.

Key Words: *Preventive Diplomacy, the 21st century international system security, geopolitics*

Introduction

The security challenges that nations and regions face today are far more complex and intertwined than ever before. As noted by Onditi et al. (2021), a wide range of non-state actors have emerged in the 21st century as contemporary dangers to both the national and international security. In addition to fundamentally altering international relations, globalization has also affected the channels through which the international security issues are experienced, channeled and addressed at all levels (Onditi et al., 2021).

The international system has a dynamic structure; specific modern security strategies have been developed to address some of the key systemic security issues of the twenty-first century. One of the most recent strategies is preventive diplomacy.

The region on the northeastern coast of Africa is known as the Horn of Africa. Historically, the region's leading countries are Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, and Somalia.

Mengisteab (2017) observes that the Horn of Africa is one of the world's most unstable regions. This is due to the rise in in-security issues, armed conflicts, and the political turmoil which has been experienced since mid-1950s. The region is also perceived to be among the least developed in the entire world as a result of the rampant socioeconomic upheavals it faces. No state in the region has ever been insulated from the issues of her neighbors, regardless of how far apart or how strong or weak they are in comparison. As a result, every state in the region has always been intimately connected to the political and security fortunes of its neighbors (Mengisteab, 2017).

International resources have historically been heavily burdened by the human crises being experienced in the region. Since the 1960s, the region has repeatedly experienced significant population shifts, a trend that is still largely rampant. This is evidenced by the huge number of refugees in the region (Ouma, 2016). The eastern African coast is also threatened by maritime piracy, which

primarily originates from Somalia, a chaotic nation, in addition to the risks posed by terrorism.

The main issue is that, despite Somalia being a haven for pirates, none of the states in the area is currently prepared to handle problems with marine security. In part, as a result of this, the UN Security Council in June 2008 enacted a resolution permitting foreign states in agreements with the transitional government of Somaliland to send warships into Somalia's territorial waters to fight pirates. The resolution gives these nations the freedom to combat regional piracy in whichever way they see fit (BBC, 2008), which has further damaged the Horn of Africa's already tenuous security balance.

The Horn of Africa contains the largest grouping of pastoralists in the world: Sudan has the highest, pastoralist percentage globally while Somalia and Ethiopia rank third and fifth respectively. In Djibouti, one third of the population are pastoralists. Kenya also has its share of pastoralist communities (Lomo, 2006). In search of water and grazing land, pastoral tribes cross borders and move with their herds within the region pitting the area at risk in a more complicated security situation (Catley et al., 2016). In all facets of pastoral social and economic life, consideration is given to the animals and their environment. Cattle serve as the foundation for identification with a range of social, political, and religious institutions in pastoralist communities where they play a significant part in the society's value system (Catley et al., 2016). This combined with weak governance; inadequate land and resource management policies; political and economical marginalisation; and increasing insecurity, resulting from small arms and cattle raiding, insecurity is taking its toll (Setrana & Adzande, 2022). In the region, tension between governments has also been exacerbated by historical, ideological, political, economic, geographical, and environmental issues, leading to animosity, rivalry, and mutual mistrust. Sometimes, as a result of the rivalry's influence on regional politics, certain insurgent forces engaged in regional battles with the rival state receiving cross-border support. This paper contends that for the dynamic security issues to be addressed, the focus should shift to preventive diplomacy. The paper presents an evaluative perspective of the concept on its application in the Horn of Africa region (Bellamy & Hunt, 2015).

Theoretical Framework

Preventive diplomacy is discussed using the lenses of Buzan and Ole Waever's Regional Security Complex theory (RSCT) founded in 2003. The theory identifies a regional security complex as a group of states whose primary national security focus are so closely intertwined that they cannot be extracted or addressed independently of each other. International security is best studied from a regional perspective, because ties between nations (and other players) reflect regular, regionally concentrated patterns, according to the RSCT (Jarzabek, 2019). The theory is rightly applicable for this study in explaining the paradigm shift from the initial realities of the cold war era, when regional security arrangements of the horn of Africa region were largely explained by the offensive theoretical perspective. The study posits that the adjustment and adaptation has been occasioned by the emerging security concerns best explained by the Regional Security Complex theory (Jarzabek, 2019).

Methodology

This study adopted an analytical desk top review approach that focused fully on secondary sources: books, book chapters, journals, magazines, and government publications among others. Data was sourced, analyzed and triangulated thematically to help identify the key themes and trends from which the study identified the key findings, conclusion and recommendations. Desktop review was favorable for this study owing to its cross sectional advantage of a wide range of source materials.

Discussions/Analysis of Findings

Strategic Interest, Geopolitics and Insecurity in the Horn of Africa Region (HoA)

In many cases, the term “geostrategic interest” refers to the national interest including security that is “either endangered in close proximity to the national mainland or in areas of unique national interests overseas” (Dimov & Ivanov, 2015). Security threats are either made directly to the major power or to the nations that make up its sphere of influence. In the second case, the major power

feels obligated to stand up for its friend. The idea of geostrategic interest might demonstrate the interdependence of geography, power, and security in the world system (Krieg, 2013).

Dimov and Ivanov (2015) argue that, due to strategic interest and geo-political dynamics, East Africa and the Horn is one of the most politically dynamic regions in the world. Geopolitical factors and regional aspirations have rarely combined to yield such unpredictable outcomes, a factor that could be best analyzed by Regional Security Complex theory by Buzan and Ole weaver, the theory upon which this study is premised. The region may not have dominated the Cold War, but it did witness the establishment of two post-colonial states (South Sudan in 2011 and Eritrea in 1991); the turbulence of that war (Ethiopia transitioned from American to Soviet authority, almost immediately following the toppling of Emperor Haile Selassie); the atrocities of the Rwandan Genocide; the opening of the Great War in DRC, and the start of the War on Terror (Ouma, 2016).

On a global scale, the region is one of the world's most strategically important, since whoever controls it has a huge impact on world events. The conflicting interests have therefore had both positive and negative security implications both for the region and to the rest of the world. Its coastal expansion on the Red Sea establishes a major maritime commerce route between Europe and Asia due to access to new markets with seductively low labor costs. Because of the abundance of its natural resources, it also has a high economic value (CRU Policy Brief, 2018).

Geographically, the region links Muslim and Christian Africa. It has a combination of regional and global political-security interests due to its Red Sea frontage, proximity to the Middle East, and harboring an internal Islamist insurgency. It serves as the continent's entry point to Asia and has long-standing relationships with the Middle East, China, and India that still manifest in trade and investment agreements today. Additionally, a number of states in the region are poised to begin producing oil, fusing the prospect of economic independence with the inequity and conflicts that frequent oil producers around the world (Humanitarian and Development Programme, 2022).

Alem (2007) argues that the Horn's strategic importance as a hub of trade and conflict has made it a major theater where governments, movements, and political groups have sought to intervene in the internal affairs of the states within the region, often contributing to instability in the entire region, thus setting some serious ripple effects not only in the region, but to the other parts of the world as well.

As a result of the geo-strategic interests, big powers frequently intervene in security matters in the Horn of Africa, in the belief that the matters threaten their interests by undermining the political and administrative infrastructure of friendly states. This part of Africa has experienced both economic and security challenges over the years, most of which are as a result of proxy wars between the opposing powers. History has shown that this type of contestation and scramble results into some form of challenges (Krieg, 2013).

All these factors have contributed to the region's vulnerability, resulting into significant conflict and securitization over the past few decades. Al-Shabaab attacks that still frequent the region and other parts, the ethnic turmoil in Ethiopia, the civil war in Somalia, Somalia's coast-based piracy; the civil wars in Darfur and South Sudan, and Djibouti's assurance of Red Sea security are just a few examples that therefore give credence and justification to the rationale for the application of preventive diplomacy in addressing the challenges bedeviling the region which is the hallmark of this paper.

Preventive Diplomacy: A Conceptual and Analytical Framework

From the global political standpoint, the communication process that is essential to the operation of the international system is referred to as diplomacy. Fundamentally, diplomacy aims at using power to establish some sort of order on the global political system, so as to leverage on the disagreements or dispute from turning into a full blown conflict or war (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

Dag Hammarskjöld's preventative diplomacy framework was forgotten with the end of the Cold War, but Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the then-UN Secretary-General, brought it back to life and gave it new meaning by defining it as the

“effort to prevent disagreements from emerging between countries, to prevent current problems from escalating into hostilities, and to limit the spread of hostilities whenever they arise.” Preventive diplomacy sits apart from other UN projects such as “peacemaking,” “peacekeeping,” and “peace building” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).

The UN has been attempting to change from a “culture of response” to that of “prevention” in terms of crisis and conflict prevention. To do this, it is essential to view preventive diplomacy as a crucial tool for the UN to carry out its mandate. As a result, the various UN agencies now have better ability to respond quickly to emergencies including armed conflict. According to the UN Charter, the organization is required to participate in preventative diplomacy, which includes among other strategies adopting political action through the Department of Political Affairs and sending out the UN Preventive Deployment Force for peacekeeping missions (UNPREDEP) (Nambiar, 2019).

The fundamental logic of preventive diplomacy cannot be contested. According to Setrana & Adzane (2002), act swiftly to quell tensions that could spark a conflict and settle current problems before they turn into crises in the future. The international community should use preventive diplomacy as early as possible to resolve conflicts, since it is least expensive, most moral, and least difficult course of action. Due in part to the inability of the international community to avoid atrocities in areas like Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia after the end of the Cold War, the century-old concept of preventative diplomacy has therefore been favored. Preemptive involvement, crisis prevention, and pre-conflict peace building are Lund’s three distinct sub-types of preventative diplomacy. They differ in terms of the tasks they accomplish, the situations in which they operate best, the deadlines they follow, and the equipment they employ (Lund, 2006).

Preventive diplomacy framework is now being practiced by more parties and through a raft of means than ever before, much like how the Horn of Africa serves as a prime example. This is due in part to the more solid normative frameworks that have been created to assist international efforts to stop violent conflict and

mass crimes and ensure that more people have a voice in governance, peace, and security-related matters. The new aggressive global powers and the new actors that have formed as a result of the devolution of power and responsibility to regional and sub-regional bodies are therefore altering the nature of preventative diplomacy (UN Security Council Resolution, 2000).

Due to the ever-present security threats, preventive diplomacy has emerged as one of the most crucial instruments for safeguarding peace, stability, and development not only in the horn of Africa, but on the entire continent. Finding flash points before they develop into open disputes and violent outbursts is the only approach to save lives, prevent individual tragedies, and avoid the society-fracturing that takes years to mend.

The Rationale for the Application of Preventive Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa Region

Due to the growing involvement of both internal and external security players to advance regional and global security agendas, the Horn of Africa is experiencing a structural shift in the types of security plans and arrangements (Zartman, 2019). Therefore, the likelihood of proxy wars, rising geopolitical tensions, and a further expansion of externally driven security agendas in the region are all made more likely by the establishment of congested international security politics in the region. In line with the theoretical framework for this study (Regional Security Complex theory) the current continental and regional security systems, which are already having a difficult time adjusting to the new external security politics, are therefore faced with significant issues as a result of this (Zartman, 2019).

Considering all these dynamics, preventive diplomacy therefore suits the Horn of Africa's situation, since appropriate intervention to the security challenges would not only require proactive measures, but also deeper and more elaborate measures that do not only focus on the manifestation of the prevailing security issues, but also on the underlying issues of governance, conflict and insecurity. Additionally, this would be very helpful in addressing disputes and conflicts that result from interstate and intrastate ties (Kirimi, 2017).

Conditions exist in most parts of the Horn of Africa that favor the formation and expansion of transnational threats. Existing governments and societal systems are under pressure to address security concerns in the region as a result of a combination of regional circumstances and the pressures of globalization. Most of these problems have some connection to the geopolitics and strategic concerns in the region (Kirimu, 2017). The region would therefore be best served by preventive diplomacy as it provides a number of players with a set of tools that would be used as needed to specifically respond to the threats and instances of mass atrocities by facilitating governance solutions since the region has multiple actors, as it has been observed in this study.

Measures for Preventive Diplomacy in the Region

Peacetime and crisis-related actions are the two basic categories into which preventive diplomatic efforts can be separated. The main areas of analysis in this paper are early warning systems, institutional development, and fostering confidence during times of peace. Focus is largely on fact-finding, good offices and goodwill missions, crisis-management, and preventative deployment.

Confidence Building

“Confidence building” refers to efforts to “make clear to concerned states, via the use of a range of means, the true nature of potentially hazardous military activities.” Building confidence frequently involves the sharing of information, early notification of military training activities and deployments, and supervision of regional arms accords (Debisa, 2021). Both state-sponsored and non-state organizations have used this strategy in the Horn of Africa.

In 2011, South Sudan separated from Sudan as a result of a historic vote for independence. However, less than three years after the historic independence referendum, the world’s newest nation entered a civil war that resulted into deaths and bloodshed. Bringing the combatants to the negotiating table in order to negotiate the settlement for a lasting peace, many regional actors, notably the AU and IGAD, employed confidence building as a preventive diplomatic technique (Francis, 2017).

The conflicting parties in South Sudan signed and approved the Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) on September 12, 2018, as a result of confidence-building measures implemented by regional authorities in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This therefore won high recognition and admiration as a remarkable development that signaled the start of peace. The unwillingness of parties to peace agreements to uphold what they had in good faith agreed to, however, has been one of the most disturbing tendencies in South Sudan's history of conflict. For obvious political reasons, agreements have been frequently executed only partially, selectively, and reluctantly (Francis, 2017).

Institution Building

In order to pursue a similar set of interests or goals, attention, skills, and resources might be organized in formal or informal methods. Institutions create norms to conduct, produce routine consultations, and foster confidence. Institutions limit players' unilateral preferences and behaviors over time and encourage cooperation.

It has been noted by Marathi (2017) that whenever governmental and social structures in a society are destroyed by conflict and insecurity, central government institutions suffer irreparable harm from insecurity, which in turn hinders the delivery of public services, as well as economic restrictions, which distort or cease the payment of civil servants or the supply of critical goods. Through population displacement, it has widened the racial divide in the Horn of Africa, fueled intercommunal conflict, and destroyed local institutions and social capital. The rule of law has collapsed as a result, and a culture of impunity has developed, hence facilitating large-scale transfer of skilled workers abroad (Murithi, 2017). This has occurred in a number of the Horn of Africa's conflict-affected nations. This study observes that preventive diplomacy is the best remedy that could pull the countries in the horn from this abyss.

Without considerable structural and institutional change, it seems likely that the problem is likely to persist (Niyitunga, 2016). Reforming governance and transforming institutions are however challenging long-term processes that

cannot be aided by ad hoc, short-term measures, some of which are largely focused at the humanitarian projects. Instead, they should be viewed as the outcome of persistent, teamwork-based efforts supported by years worth of long-term strategies.

In the context of the horn of Africa region, there is no one fit that works for all local governance improvements rather, a case-by-case plan must be developed in light of a thorough assessment of the current institutional, social, political, and governance contexts. Establishing “norms” or encouraging rule-governed behavior among the players is a crucial component in institution-building for the state that have been adversely affected by internal conflicts in the horn of Africa Region. Multilateralism, non-intervention, and pacific dispute resolution are a few examples of such standards. In a broad sense, meetings and dialogue that are started primarily by non-governmental actors may be helpful for institution-building (Zartman, 2019).

Early Warning Systems

Onditi et al. (2021) argues that one of the measures for preventive diplomacy is for keeping an eye on the development of natural disasters, refugee flows, the threat of starvation, and the spread of disease, among other areas in the political, military, and ecological frameworks which, if not stopped, result into an upsurge in violence or significant humanitarian catastrophes. In relation to the Horn of Africa region, international interest in early-warning of human rights abuses and refugee migrations has grown significantly in recent years.

According to various schools of thought, the Early Warning System was created with humanitarian ideas in mind, whereas the other claims that it had military origins. The first argument contends that early warning systems were developed in the field of national military intelligence during the Cold War to enhance the capability to anticipate upcoming (ballistic) strikes (Simon & Niels, 2006). The latter, however, contends that early warning systems have developed as a means of anticipating environmental dangers, especially during natural calamities like earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and floods (Nambiar, 2019). Nevertheless, the concept is rapidly being used in a variety of socioeconomic fields. This is quite

in sync with the focus for this study as captured in the title: adjusting to the new realities of the 21st century international system. The value of preventing disputes rather than resolving them through reactive means is becoming increasingly clear. Conflict avoidance has been found to be more advantageous in terms of protecting lives and cutting expenditures. Consequently, Article 12 of the African Union Peace and Security Protocol calls for the creation of a continental early warning system (CEWS). To acquire intelligence, this system works closely with regional organizations, all information is then sent to the situation room at the headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Its stated objective is to aid in Africa's conflict prediction and prevention (Debisa, 2021).

The East African Community (EAC), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CEN-Sahel), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States are among the eight regional organizations that make up this framework (Rondos, 2016). Together with the eight regional organizations, the development of the situation room in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and the choice of indicators for data gathering have all been acknowledged as key contributions to the Conflict Early Warning (CEWS) in the horn of Africa region.

Since it was first founded, the CEWS has however undergone several revisions to help adjust to the 21st century realities. By working together, the eight IGAD Member States created the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN). The IGAD Member States established the CEWARN Mechanism to efficiently use the framework to respond to violent conflicts in the region and realize the aspirations for shared prosperity and a lasting, just peace in the Horn of Africa region (Francis, 2017).

Preventive Humanitarian Action

The major objectives of preventative humanitarian intervention are to prevent and control the humanitarian impacts of political conflicts as well as the political and humanitarian impacts of natural catastrophes. The World Health Organization (WHO) states that early humanitarian intervention in crises arising from long-term economic collapse, or slow-moving environmental calamities, such as drought,

can prevent the need for millions of dollars in additional corrective actions, and thousands of deaths. As ambassadors of preventative diplomacy in the Horn of Africa region, NGOs, bilateral and multilateral development organizations, and regional organizations all play a crucial role in this area (WHO, 2018).

According to Bellamy & Hunt (2015), security-related issues continue to pose the biggest danger to the safety and dignity of those who live in the Horn of Africa. The deaths and displaced persons in the area are attributable to the region's ongoing and recent wars, violence during elections, and those between communities. The primary cause of displacement in the region, has largely been as a result of conflict. The region is already susceptible as war occurrences are predicted to rise over the next few years as a result of a variety of triggers.

The humanitarian system is currently not well-tuned for readiness and quick action. This can be attributed in part to overstretching brought about by conflicting demands from crises that are currently occurring and receiving more attention, as well as in part, to a lack of prioritizing and money, both of which should improve (Bellamy & Hunt, 2015).

Regional and Sub-Regional Security Partnership and Preventive Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa Region

According to the World Health Organization, preventative humanitarian intervention aims to reduce the humanitarian impact of political conflicts and natural calamities. Early crisis-related humanitarian intervention may avoid millions of dollars in additional corrective efforts and thousands of fatalities. Non governmental organizations, bilateral and multilateral development organizations, and regional organizations have also played a crucial role as ambassadors of preventive diplomacy in the Horn of Africa region as international politics and globalization effect regionalism in the contemporary world (Onditi et al., 2021).

Nearly all governments engage in regionalism, which also includes non-state actors and leads to official and informal regional governance structures and regional networks in most problematic areas. The current regionalism's complexity and heterogeneity make it difficult to comprehend the current security situation.

World politics' dynamism and globalization's acceleration affect contemporary regionalism. Since practically, all governments engage in some kind of regionalism, there are official and informal methods of regional governance and regional networks in most subject areas. Modern regionalism's variety and complexity provide new security problems and concerns. Dynamic global politics and accelerating globalization affect today's regionalism (Mengisteab, 2017).

Moreover, almost all governments throughout the globe engage in regionalism, which includes non-state players and leads to official and informal regional governance structures and regional networks in most problematic areas (Makiara, 2010). The intricacies and variety of contemporary regionalism make comprehending modern security difficult. In today's international system, regionalism is linked to international politics and globalization. Almost all nations practice regionalism, a worldwide phenomenon that affects non-state enterprises. Multiple official and informal regional government systems exist in most subject areas.

However, this requires broad security lenses. Along with protection from harm, one of the core characteristics of security is the ability of countries and civilizations to sustain their identities and structural integrity against hostile change agents. According to this viewpoint, survival is the most important aspect of security, although the notion includes a broad range of daily concerns. Regional groups are discussing diplomacy and conflict resolution more (Mancini, 2011). PSC, CEWS, and EASF have all been active. East African Community (EAC) and IGAD have been engaged in resolving disputes before and after they become violent.

Long-term success for security initiatives in any area requires a full grasp of regional institutions that promote economic integration, create shared norms and standards for security and governance, and build collective problem-solving capacities. The Horn of Africa has regional institutions that are unable to enhance cross-border security despite foreign attempts to develop such institutions and patterns (Mumma-Martinon, 2010).

African Union and Preventive Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa Region

According to the United Nations Charter of 1945, institutions supported by states hold the power of the international security system, which is structured along ideological as well as regional and zonal basis. In the continent of Africa, Africa Union has been very key in as far as security matters in the continent are concerned, as the security architect of the continent is patterned by the AU. According to the 1945 UN Charter, state-backed organizations control the international security system, which is ideological, regional, and zonal. Africa Union is the continent's security architect, hence its role in security concerns is crucial. The African Union (AU) is an intergovernmental organization comprising 53 African nations. South Africa assumed OAU's post in Durban on July 9, 2002. Morocco joined the OAU on November 12, making it the first country to do so since the OAU recognized the SADR as a sovereign state in February 1982 (Wellens, 1990).

The AU's aims include building greater solidarity and togetherness among African states and peoples, advancing the integration of politics and the economy, supporting democratic ideals, institutions, public participation, and good governance, and encouraging peace, security, and stability (Article 3 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union). Preventive diplomacy is a new tactic the AU has created to manage internal security threats. Many of the AU's recent policies, notably as its position on the "global war on terror" (primarily Western) forces, have been influenced by foreign parties (Rotberg, 2005).

The African Union High-Level Implementation Panel for Sudan (AUHIP) actively engaged in peace discussions and worked as a mediator between the Sudanese government, armed groups, and opposition organizations. AUHIP was the most important regional player, although IGAD watched the peace talks. AUHIP's mediation efforts have focused on the crisis in Darfur and Abyei as part of the National Dialogue (Catley et al., 2016).

AMISOM is an African Union security operation in the Horn of Africa. AMISOM was part of a large network of collaborators when it landed in Mogadishu in March 2007. It is an example of "partnership peacekeeping," which the UN

secretary-general calls peacekeeping supported by international organizations, states, private firms, and local authorities (UN Security Council, Partnering for Peace, 2015).

IGAD and Preventive Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa Region

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) aimed to fight East African poverty, starvation, drought, and environmental degradation. In order to take into consideration, the political, social, and economic changes in East Africa, its goals were expanded in 1996, and since then, the creation of an effective security policy among the member states has been the fundamental goal of the IGAD. In addition to preserving peace, security, and stability, the main objectives of the IGAD are to develop regional integration and economic growth among its member states (Niyitunga, 2016).

The IGAD Charter's Article 18A outlines the group's security plan for East Africa. Building an effective system of consultation and collaboration is necessary for the peaceful settlement of disagreements and disputes. It is also important for regional cooperation to sustain the peace, security, and stability that are necessary for social and economic progress and to act forcefully as a unit to remove threats to peace, safety, and stability (IGAD, 2020). The states in the region deal with a number of interrelated security problems. Significant wars, which are frequently confined within national lines, are absent from these countries. Instead, if such disputes are not resolved quickly, they frequently affect neighboring nations in addition to drawing more nations in the region into the mix (Rondos, 2016).

Makiara (2010) observes that IGAD's top priorities are the security and peace concerns in the Horn of Africa. This is due to the fact that IGAD has managed some of the main peace and security initiatives in the region. As a result, the organization is vital to the Horn of Africa's political and security system and has been instrumental in efforts to bring about peace in Somalia and Sudan. Largely, due to the efforts of IGAD, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) for Sudan was made feasible. The longest-running conflict in Africa came to an end when the CPA was signed on January 9th, 2005 in Nairobi. The Government

of Southern Sudan and the international community are concerned that the CPA is behind schedule in crucial areas, such as the demarcation of the North-South border, power sharing, governance issues, wealth (oil) sharing, resolution of the Abyei conflict, security arrangements, and the process of national healing, despite the fact that there has been significant progress in its implementation (Mumma, 2010).

The institutional foundation and track records required by IGAD to carry out activities that support peace, particularly those that include peace enforcement, are lacking. Institutionally, the East African Standby Force, which is the bigger East African component of the African Standby Force (EASF) is in charge of overseeing IGAD's operations in this region. However, efforts in this area have relied on the support of individual member countries on the political and diplomatic fronts as well as encouragement or coercion from external partners (Kidane, 2011).

Building regional capability for counterterrorism has been a step toward preventive diplomacy in the region. For instance, security officials regularly gather throughout eastern Africa to develop systems for intelligence sharing (relating to terrorism) and ideas for universal antiterrorism legislation that would prevent suspected terrorists from one nation from seeking asylum in another (Khadiagala, 2008). Similar gatherings of intelligence officials from thirteen African countries took place in Kenya in June 2004 to develop a coordinated terrorist approach. They agreed on a counterterrorism strategy that includes growing capacity, funding for cutting-edge technology, education, and law. In order to coordinate these efforts, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) established a four-year Capacity Building Program against Terrorism in June (Rondos, 2016).

Key Challenges to the Application of Preventive Diplomacy in the Horn of Africa Region

The Horn of Africa governments have a horrible track record when it comes to democratization, and their shared history of instability has only served to foster mistrust. Since then, efforts to carry out preventive diplomacy in the area have

been severely impeded. Both totalitarian autocracies and nations with democratic histories, a focus on human rights, and the rule of law are represented in the IGAD region. Many of these governments also back controversial regional and national laws that promote competition and mistrust both inside and between the member states. The state of regional security only highlights existing weak governance and authoritarian tendencies (Francis, 2017).

The concept of preventive diplomacy has proven to be controversial in the Horn of Africa region since the principle of state sovereignty limits most states from intervening from preventing internal problems, especially at the pre-conflict stages. Early involvement is often essential to the success of preventive diplomacy, but parties to conflicts often are not willing to admit they have a problem until the conflict has escalated beyond their control. They may contemplate avoiding legitimatizing an adversary or ‘internationalizing’ their problem by keeping off other actors, only to admit and accept their intervention when this has spiraled out of control (Musoma, 2021).

Conclusion

Preventive diplomacy is now carried out by numerous actors using a variety of tools. This is now achievable as a result of the development of a normative framework that supports global initiatives to avert violent conflict. International cooperation is essential because it doubles up diplomatic and international efforts by leveraging their combined resources and impact. Therefore, the Horn of Africa and the African continent as a whole should benefit from this normative framework. The political good will of national authorities, their capacity to accurately assess current risk factors, and their willingness to work with other important players in the international system to take appropriate action to address concerns before they spiral out of control remain the three key components of preventive diplomacy in the Horn of Africa region.

Recommendations

- The international community should endeavor to increase states’ capacity to handle the full range of security concerns in both their internal and

regional domains in addition to placing more focus on preventative diplomacy and providing more resources for its operations.

- A more stable governmental system in Somalia would be a significant political and security answer to the region's issues, given its importance to the security problems in the Horn of Africa, hence the international community's first goal should be to stabilize Somalia.
- The fundamental root of the region's violence and instability is widely acknowledged to be poor governance since politics and governance play a crucial role in both fostering conflict and resolving the political and security issues that the region's nations are currently confronting. Focus for the international community should therefore be to enforce good governance among the states in the Horn of Africa region.

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